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FUTURE INTERESTS-ACCELERATION OF VESTED REMAINDERS SUBJECT
TO COMPLETE DEFEASANct-In 1938 the defendant, grantor, executed a deed
by which she purported to vest a remainder in her son, the plaintiff herein, subject to a life estate in herself and. in her husband should he survive her. The
deed further provided that should her son die before the survivor of her husband
and herself, then the property was to pass share and share alike to the son's then
living heirs.1 The grantor survived her husband. Shortly after his death she

The deed contained the following special provisions:
"Miriam Gordon, wife of Roderick Gordon, grantor, of Natrona County, and State
of Wyoming, for and in consideration of One Dollar ( $ 1.00) and other good and
valuable consideration, receipt whereo,f is hereby acknowledged, conveys and warrants
against her own acts but upon the conditions herein expressed to Leonard E. Singleton,
grantee •.. and share and share alike to the then Uoing heirs of said primarily named
grantee if he is deceased upon the date of the death of the suroioor of said Miriam Gor1
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conveyed her life estate to her son for the express purpose of destroying it through
merger with the remainder vested in her son. 2 Subject to the execution of this
second deed the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant, May M.
Maxwell, for the sale of tile property. Upon examination of the title the defendant purchaser refused to consumate the transaction without first obtaining
judicial determination and declaration that the seller had a good and lawful right
to convey the property in fee. The plaintiff then brought this action for declaratory judgment as to the construction of the above described deeds. 8 Held, though
the deed to the plantiff conveyed only a vested remainder subject to complete
defeasance, the remainder was accelerated by the premature determination of
the preceding estate through merger; and the contingent remainder in the son's
Jon and said Roderick Gordon, the following described real estate ••• ( description of
property).
" .•• Granter reserves during her life time and that of her husband, if he survives
her, the right to exclusive possession of the property aforesaid and all values accruing
therefrom. This instrument is a present cotweyance of legal title with. postponement
of possessory rights only and is not testamentary in character" (principal case at p. 139).
(Italics the court's).
2 The deed contained this express recital of intent:
"It is covenanted and agreed by and between the parties hereto that the granter
holds a life estate in and to the said premises and that this deed is given for the purpose
of conveying to the grantee the said life estate and to merge and extinguish the said life
estate in the reversion and inheritance of said premises and that the said grantee herein
shall hereafter hold said premises free of the burden of the life estate of the granter
the same as might be effected by the sometimes used more formal clause which reads as
follows: 'to have and to hold said property unto the said Leonard E. Singleton, his heirs
and assigns subject to the estate for life of the said Miriam Gordon therein, to the
intent that the same may merge and be extinguished in the reversion and in the inheritance of said premises, and that the said Leonard E. Singleton thereafter may be
seized of or entitled to the fee simple and inheritance in possession thereof" (id. at p.
139).
3 The lower court had held as follows:
"I. That the plaintiff has a life estate in and to the premises involved herein.so
long as the defendant, Miriam Gordon, shall be living.
"2. That the plaintiff, Leonard E. Singleton, has a vested remainder in fee simple
in and to the property herein involved, subject to divestment by the death of the
plaintiff prior to the death of the defendant, Miriam Gordon, and which said vested
remainder will ripen into a fee simple absolute title in the event plaintiff shall survive
the said Miriam Gordon.
"3. That in the event of the death of Leonard E. Singleton, prior to the death
of Miriam Gordon, the fee simple absolute title to the premises is vested under the
deed of February 3, 1938, upon the death of Miriam Gordon, in the heirs of Leonard
E. Singelton, who were living on the 3rd day of February, 1938, to-wit Helen Singleton, should she survive Leonard E. Singleton as his spouse, and George Singleton and
Melvin Singleton or the survivor or survivors of them who may also survive Miriam
Gordon" (principal case at p. 140).
The conclusions reached by the lower court in syllabus paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2 are
supported by the weight of authority. Syllabus paragraph 3 is not in accord with the
general rule that the class is to be left open until the time of distribution.
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then living heirs was destroyed thus vesting in the son a present fee simple absolute. Singleton v. Gordon, (Wyo. 1943) 144 P. (2d) 138.
There is very little authority in the United States or in England on the
question of whether the doctrine of acceleration of future interests 4 is one which
is applicable to intervivos transactions 5 as well as to wills. 6 It would seem that
the reason for its application is not present with any great force in the former
situation for the deed takes effect, in the great majority of the cases, while the
grantor is alive. Should the first limitation fail, the grantor may make a new
disposition or treat-it in any manner that he chooses; whatever he does, however,
indicates his intent unequivocably. 7 There is no necessity for a court to attempt
4 As the term is used in the law of property, it refers to a hastening of the owner
of the future interest toward a status of present possession or enjoyment by reason of
the failure of the preceding estate. I & 3 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, §§ 223, 751

(1936).
5 Miller v. Miller, 91 Kan. 1, 136 P. 953 (1913), while admitting that there
might be some circumstances in which the doctrine would apply, held that it should
not be applied to the facts at issue. The grantor recorded a deed conveying a life estate
to his son and to his son's wife should she survive him, with the remainder in the heirs
of the body of the son; the son refused the· life_estate and the wife claimed that her
vested life estate was accelerated. The court decreed that she was not entitled to
possession before her husband's death in spite of his rejection of the life estate; 2
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 231, comment e, p. 964 (1940).
For a discussion of the English authorities, see Farrer, "Acceleration of Remainders," 32 L. Q. REv. 392 (1916). Only two possible situations are suggested as ones
in which there would be an acceleration of a remainder created by deed: (a) In case
of limitations of the legal estate in fee to trustees, and a prior equitable limitation, or
prior trusts being void in inception, or, being valid in inception, being subsequently
determined or disclaimed, the subsequent equitable limitations, or trusts, will be accelerated providing that an intention to that effect appear in the de~d. (b) If by deed there
be legal limitations first for a valid life estate, then for a void life estate, then in remainder, the void life estate will be at once squeezed out, and the remainder accelerated
on the first valid life estate. Co. LITT. 298 (a).
6 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 752, p. 227 (1936). The doctrine may be analytically classified as a problem of construction. Such problems do, of course, arise in
the interpretation of deeds, but the primary purpose of these rules of construction is
the determination of the devolution of property after the possibility of ascertaining
the intent of the one disposing of the property has passed and the court is faced with
the necessity of deciding not only what the di;ceased intended but also what should or
ought he have intended. 2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Ap. 48 (1940). The problem
of acceleration is normally discussed in conjunction with its corollary-that of sequestration. Since the problem is one of construction the considerations which lead the courts
to sequester the renounced interests are, at the same time, arguments against a construction which accelerates a succeeding interest. The purpose of this note, however, is
to analyze ouly those factors, aside from the sequestration problem, which the courts
consider in determining whether or not a given future interest is to be accelerated.
7 The doctrine of acceleration of remainders will rarely apply in the case of
grants by deed. A deed sounds in contract. It takes effect on delivery and not after
the grantor's death, and, in the absence of the equivalent of alternative provisions, the
presumption is that each grantee is given what the grantor intended he should receive.
If anyone refuses to take, his share remains a portion of the grantor's estate to be dis-
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to work out a solution based upon presumed intent or equitable principles. An
argument for the application of such a doctrine could be supported, perhaps, were
it shown that, although the disposition was by deed, the renunciation or other
act, which destroyed the estate preceding the one sought to be accelerated, occurred after the death of the grantor and in the absence of any alternative disposition by him. 8 This suggestion, however, does not seek to justify the result
reached in the principal case for the grantor was not dead and the intent is clearly
expressed.9 The chief difficulty in the application of the doctrine to the facts in
the principal case lies in the rule that a conveyance of the life estate subsequent
to the creation of the future interests does not accelerate the remainder. It is
the premature determination of the pri~r estate, either through voluntary renunciation or through the application of some other rule of law which relates the
transactions back to the inception of the interests, that is the condition precedent
to the operation of the doctrine. 11 The act which accelerates the remainder may
be the death of the life tenant during the testator's life,1 2 the incapacity of the
life tenant,1 3 the life tenant's remarriage, 14 his or her renunciation,15 or the
revocation of the life estate by the subsequent codicil or other testamentary disposition by the testator. 16 It would be possible to provide in the creating instruposed of by will or by deed, as he may desire, or descend to his heirs, and is not to be
absorbed by other grantees whose portions are defined by the instrument. Miller v.
Miller, 91 Kan. 1 (1913); 33 AM. JR.,§ 154, p. 621 (1941).
8 It might be answered that the residuary legatee in the grantor's will, or his heirs,
would be the ones to take such a lapsed interest. This would be a possible solution but,
since the property was not considered by the grantor as a part of. his estate, the court
could construe the deed as though it were an independent testamentary disposition.
9 Supra, note 2.
1 °Keir v. Keir, 155 Cal. 96, 99 P. 487 (1909) (vested remainder); Brownback
v. Keister, 220 Ill. 544, 77 N.E. 75 (1905) (contingent remainder); Cummings v.
Hamilton, 220 Ill. 480, 77 N.E. 264 (1905) (contingent remainder); Birdsal v. Birdsal, 157 Iowa 363, 132N.W. 809 (1911) (contingent remainder); In Re Nilsson, II2
N.J. Eq. 445, 164 A. 578 (1933) (vested remainder subject to complete defeasance).
Schmeider v. Meyer, 97 N. J. Eq. 335, 127 A 162 (1925) (vested remainder subject
to complete defeasance). Cf. Bennett v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 123 N.J. Eq. 198,
196 A. 375 (1938).
11 2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§ 231-237 (1940); 2 JARMAN, W1LLS, 7th ed.,
700 (1930).
12 Taylor v. Wendel, 4 Bradford (N. Y. Surr.) 324 (1857); Mercer v. Hopkins,
88 Md. 292, 41 A. 156 (1898); Huber v. Mohn, 37 N. J. Eq. 432 (1883); Mowatt
v. Carow, 7 Paige (N. Y. Ch.) 328 (1838).
13 Darcus v. Crump, 6 B. Mon. (45 Ky.) 363 (1846); Key v. Weathersbee, 43
S. C. 414, 21 S. E. 324 (1894); Jull v. Jacobs, 3 Ch. D. 703 (1876).
14 Duncan v. Liddle, 123 Ark. 35, 184 S. W. 413 (1916); Clark v. Tennison, 33
Md. 85 (1870); Fletcher v. Hoblitzell, 209 Pa. 337, 58 A. 672 (1904).
is Mechanics Natl. Bank of Mobile v. Hubbard, 222 Ala. 518, 133 So. 723
(1931); Ward v. Ward, 153 Kan. 222, 109 P. (2d) 68 (1941); Breckenridge v.
Breckenridge's Exrs., 264 Ky. 82, 94 S. W. (2d) 283 (1936); Christian v. Wilson's
Exrs., 153 Va. 614, 151 S. E. 300 (1930), certiorari denied, 282 U.S. 840, 51 S. Ct.
21 (1931); O'Rear v. Bogie, 157 Ky. 666, 163 S. W. 1107 (1914).
16 Green v. Tribe, 9 Ch. D. 231 (1878): Eavestaff v. Austin, 19 Beav. 591, 52
Eng. Rep. 480 (1854); Lainson v. Lainson, 18 Beav. 1, 52 Eng. Rep. l (1854).
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ment that the assign~ent of a life interest could be the basis of its forfeiture; 17
but, where the -grant is silent, the life tenant is presumed to have a freely alienable interest. Consequently the alienation of such an estate would not seem to be
a suitable occasion for the employment of the doctrine. If the acceleration of
the remainder by the merger of the life estate in it were permitted, the intent of
the testator would be frequently defeated.18 Often the remainder is a vested
one subject either to partial: or complete defeasance by some event to occur within
a period measured by the duration of the life estate; yet the accerlation through
merger would effectively end the possibility of defeasance, for the life _estate
would have been terminated 19 without actual in jury to the life tenant and to
the benefit of the remaindermen contrary to the testator's intent. A final point
of analysis is the application of the' principles of acceleration to the different types
or kinds of remainders. Even conceding that the principles might have been
applied to this situation, should they apply to the kind of remainder here involved? Do the distinctions drawn between remainders subject to a condition
precedent, vested remainders, vested remainders subject to partial defeasance,
and ones subject to complete defeasance, aid in the determination of whether
or not an interest should be accel,erated? 20 Some writers speak of the acceleration of absolutely vested interests as though the question involved the mere application of a rule-of law to the facts, disregarding the problem of construction.21
A contrary position has been adopted by other writers and courts. They have
argued that, since the principle is based upon the presumed intention of the testator, the reason for distinguishing between 'vested and contingent remainders
no longer exists.22 A better view would seem to lie somewhere between these
two positions. 23 The particular issue raised by the principal case is that of acceleration of vested remainders subject to complete defeasance. Acceleration is very
rarely denied merely because the succeeding interest is coupled with a substitu17 Conger v. Lowe, 124 Ind. 368, 24 N.E. 889 (1890); Lockyer v. Savage, 2
Strange 947, 93 Eng. Rep. 959 (1733).
18 Keir v. Keir, 155 Cal. 96 (1909).
19 ln re Nilsson, II2 N. J. Eq. 445 (1933); Schmeider v. Meyer, 97 N. J. Eq.
3 3 5 ( 192 5). Were the acceleration concept applied to the merger situation, there
would be no greater distortion of the testator's intent than occurs upon the premature
determination of the preceding estate by one of the above enumerated events; but, since
no controlling rule of law is involved and since there are sound precedents against such
a merger, the courts ~ould seem to be adopting a sound approach because the ulterior
devises are thereby left as the testator desired them to be.
20 The principal case uses the terminology of the PROPERTY RESTATEMENT in defining remainders but fails to recognize the distinctions implicit in the definition of the
terms.
21 Ward v. Ward, 153 Kan. 222 (1941); 9 lowA L. BuL. 313 (1924); l TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, c. 6, § 146 (1912).
22 Scotten v. Moore, 5 Boyce (28 Del.) 545, 93 A. 373 (1915); In re Crothers,
(1915) I Ir. R. 53, 49 Ir. L. T. 35; Fox v. Rumery, 68 Me. 121 (1878). For a
possible analysis of these cases see 2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Ap. 55, note IO (1940).
For other cases allowing the acceleration of contingent remainders see annotations in 5
A.L.R. 461 (1920); 17 A.L.R. 314 (1922); 62 A.L.R. 206 (1929).
23 2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,§§ 231-233 (1940); 3 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,
§§ 755-759 (1936).
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tionary disposition. 24 It does not necessarily follow, however, that the accelerated
interest vests indefeasibly. 25 When the only condition precedent or cause of
defeasance of the accelerated interest is the prematurely determined interest, then
normally the accelerated interest is to be construed to have been intended to be
defeated only while it continued to be nonpossessory. Thus, if the acceleration
is one which eliminates the nonpossessory character of the accelerated interest,
the defeasibility of such interest likewise terminates. 26 On the other hand the
limitation over may be accompanied by other facts manifesting an intent that
such succeeding interests, though accelerated, shall still remain defeasible upon
the occurrence of the stipulated event at any time during the period for which
the prematurely determined interest, if effective, would have lasted, then the
manifest intent of the testator prevails and the remainder continues to be defeasible. 27 An application of these criteria to the principal case shows that the
remainder in the son is one which might properly be accelerated were the other
necessary circumstances present. But as has been seen, the court appears to have
applied the doctrines of acceleration to a situation in which they have not been
considered to be applicable. Nevertheless the decision seems to be in accord with
the intent of the parties. Indeed, it could be justified as a matter of construction,
resting on its own peculiar facts and not on any rules as to the acceleration of
future interests.

Allen C. Holmes

24 The cases do not seem to distinguish between a remainder contingent upon surviving the termination of the precedent estate and one vested subject to being divested
in favor of another in event of the death of the first taker before the termination of the
precedent estate. Slocum v. Hagaman, 176 Ill. 533, 52 N. E. 332 (1898); Small v.
Marburg, 77 Md. II, 25 A. 920 (1893); In re Schultz's Estate, 113 Mich. 592, 71
N. W. 1079 (1897). Cf. Sawyer v. Freeman, 161 Mass. 543, 37 N. E. 942 (1894);
Cotton v. Fletcher, 77 N. H. 216, 90 A. 510 (1914).
25 Cockey v. Cockey, 141 Md. 373, u8 A. 850 (1922).
26 2 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,§ 231, comment h, p. 966 (1940).
27 Hasemeier v. Welke, 309 Ill. 460, 141 N. E. 176 (1923); Parker v. Ross, 69
N. H. 213, 45 A. 576 (1897).

